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Introduction
The Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a) debate on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. This paper is an extension of the debate without partially negating the former's methodological underpinning as in the latter's approach. The prime motivation for this extension is the possibility that, the effectiveness of foreign aid could be contingent on institutional thresholds, such that countries with higher initial levels of institutional quality are affected differently in comparison to their counterparts with lower initial levels of institutional quality. Though not in substance, yet in form, this hypothesis is the methodological underpinning of Okada & Samreth that is partially neglected by Asongu. In light of this development, policy makers should be curious to know how the results of Asongu may change if the context were examined with the methodological underpinnings of Okada & Samreth. Put in plainer terms; are the institutional perils of foreign aid questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place? An answer to the question also unites two important strands in the aid-institutions nexus literature.
From the interesting literature on aid and institutions, the debate has centered around three main questions. Firstly, do donors allocate more to poor countries with better institutions? Secondly, does foreign aid induce better or worse institutional quality? Thirdly, how do outsiders engineer a transition from the present state of informal institutions towards more formal institutional settings via foreign aid? The first strand of the debate is relevant because donors have widely supposed that aid would be more effective in countries with better institutions. Accordingly, the answer to the first concern also affects the response to the second. Hence, if donors give more aid to countries with better institutions, this would create an incentive for reformers in the recipient country to adapt to better institutions. A considerable bulk of the literature has found no evidence that democracies or less corrupt states are rewarded with more development assistance (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002) . On the second question, a substantial chunk of the literature has pointed to the institutional (Knack, 2001; Asongu, 2012a) and democratic (Djankov et al., 2005) perils of foreign-aid, especially in ethnically fractionalized states (Svensson, 2000) . Lastly, there is the challenging third question (strand) about how aid would practically go about changing institutions in the interest of developing recipient countries. Accordingly, the transition from informal to formal institutions is somehow complex and attempts by Western aid agencies to introduce top-down formal institutions have not fared well in the complicated maze of bottom-up arrangements. To this third concern, Dixit (2004) has presented an interesting argument as to how introducing rule-based institutions could actually make things worse, as they create outside opportunities for members of relationship-based networks 2 .
Cognizant of the above, this paper contributes to existing literature by examining the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a) debate in light of the last two strands (questions) within the same empirical framework. In adding some empirical structure to the issues raised, the present study provides answers to the following questions. Are the institutional perils of development-assistance contingent on existing institutional quality (second strand)? At what institutional thresholds is foreign-aid effective in improving institutional quality (third strand)? Are the institutional perils of foreign-aid questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place (second and third strands)? This study also contributes to existing literature by cutting adrift the mainstream approach to the debate that does not incorporate all dimensions of institutional quality. Accordingly, the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a) debate lack a unifying framework that explores the most quantifiable government quality indicators currently available. To bridge this gap, we provide an exhaustive assessment with eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, voice & accountability, government effectiveness, corruption, political stability, corruption-control and democracy) 3 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Measurement and methodology issues are discussed in Section 2. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. We conclude with Section 4.
Data and Methodology 2.1 Data
We examine a panel of 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 with data from African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB), Transparency International and La Porta et al., (2008, p. 289) 4 . Variable definitions and corresponding sources are presented in Appendix 3. Institutional quality dependent variables include: rule of law, regulation quality, corruption-control, voice & accountability, government-effectiveness, political stability (or no violence), corruption and democracy. The exogenous variable of interest is Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). For robustness purposes we use three different NODA indicators: Total NODA; NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries; and NODA from Multilateral Donors. While the first is used in the empirical section, the last two have been used for robustness checks. Borrowing from the literature on the determinants of institutional quality, we control for foreign investment, trade, per capita economic prosperity and public investment (Goel & Nelson, 2005; Lambsdorff, 2006) . We also control for the unobserved heterogeneity by employing dummies for low-income, English common-law and landlocked countries. Landlocked countries are inherently less developed (François & Manchin, 2006) . English Common law countries have higher levels of institutional quality in Africa (Asongu, 2011; Asongu, 2012b, p. 190) . Also, government quality in Africa increases with income levels (Asongu, 2012b, p. 190) .
Details about the descriptive statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation analysis (showing the relationships between key variables used in the paper), and variable definitions are presented in the appendices. The 'summary statistics' ( Panel A of Appendix 1) of the variables used in the panel regressions shows that there is quite some variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge. Countries making-up the panel are presented in Panel B of Appendix 1. The purpose of the correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is to address issues resulting from overparametization and multicolinearity. Based on a preliminary assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any serious concerns in terms of the relationships to be estimated.
Methodology
Consistent with recent literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013) , to determine whether existing levels of institutional dynamics affect how development assistance comes into play, we use quantile regression. This approach permits us to assess if the relationship among institutional dynamics and foreign-aid differs throughout the distributions of institutional dynamics (Koenker & Hallock, 2001) . Thus, based on this estimation technique we are able to carefully examine the incidence of development assistance throughout the conditional distribution with particular emphasis on countries with the best and worst institutions. Quantile regression (hence QR) yields parameters estimated at multiple points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) . Accordingly, the  th quantile estimator of the endogenous variable is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem.
Where  is in the '0 and 1' interval. Contrary to OLS that is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For example the 10 th or 75 th quantiles (with  =0.10 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of i y given i x is:
where unique slope parameters are derived for each  th quantile of interest. This formulation is analogous to
in the OLS slope though parameters are estimated only at the mean of the conditional distribution of the endogenous variable. For the model in Eq. (2) the dependent variable i y is an institutional quality indicator while i x contains a constant term, foreign-aid, foreign investment, trade, per capita economic prosperity, public investment and fixed effects (low-income, English common law and landlocked countries).
Empirical analysis 3.1 Presentation of results
The results presented in Tables 2-3 include OLS and QR estimates. OLS estimates provide a baseline of mean effects and we compare these to estimates of separate quantiles in the conditional distributions of the institutional dynamic dependent variables. In the interpretation of estimated coefficients, it is worth noting that smaller values (in conditional distributions) of the dependent variables denote less institutional quality (in terms of democracy, rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption, political stability, voice & accountability and corruption-control). Table 2 shows results for the rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness and political stability regressions while Table 3 reports those of voice & accountability, democracy, corruption and corruption-control. Table 1 below summarizes the foreign-aid effects on institutional development based on findings in Tables 2-3. The motivation for this summary is to synthesize the potential incidence of foreign-aid on institutional development when existing government-quality dynamics matter. Based on the summary of results, it could be concluded that, but for a thin exception (lowest quantile of voice & accountability) foreign aid broadly mitigates institutional quality. The positive incidence on voice & accountability could be attributed to the strict accounting standards required by donor organizations in recipient countries with inherently very low accountability standards. Most of the control variables are significant with the right signs. Landlocked countries inherently have lower levels of development (François & Manchin, 2006) . English Common law countries have higher levels of institutional quality in Africa (Asongu, 2011; Asongu, 2012b, p. 190) . Government quality in Africa also increases with income levels (Asongu, 2012b, p. 190) . The OLS findings are also broadly consistent with the negative incidence of foreign aid on institutional quality. 
Discussion
For more than half a century, the political economy of foreign-aid has been widely debated in academic and policy-making circles. A substantial literature on institutions and development suggests that, Africa is poor because it is deficient of good institutions: dictatorships, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract-enforcement, political instability, high corruption, violence and hostile regulatory environment for private business (Easterly, 2005; Kodila-Tedika, 2012a , 2013a , 2013b . With respect to this strand, in order to end African poverty, the West needs to promote good institutions. In response to how foreign-aid might promote good institutions in aid-recipient countries, much of the literature has focused on how institutions matter in the effectiveness of foreign-aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005) . This present paper has united two strands of the debate in light of the recent development from Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a) .
From the available weight of empirical evidence (as summarized in Table 1 above), the following answers could be provided to the examined questions. But for a thin exception (voice and accountability in the lowest quantile), foreign-aid mitigates institutional development. The institutional perils of foreign-aid are not questionable when greater domestic institutional development has already taken place. Hence, the hypothesis that the institutional benefits of foreign aid are contingent on existing institutional levels in Africa is not valid. Drawing from the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a) debate, it could be concluded that even without partially negating the former's methodological standpoint, foreign aid remain perilous to institution development in Africa. These findings are broadly consistent with the early strand of literature supporting the thesis of a negative aid-development nexus (Mosley, 1992; Reichel, 1995; Ghura, 1995; Boone, 1996; Pedersen, 1996) . 
Conclusion
We have extended the Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB) debate on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' by: not partially negating the former's methodological underpinning (as in the latter's approach) with a unifying empirical framework and; broadening the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, control of corruption and political stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency of the 'institutional perils of foreign aid' on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional downside of development assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place. Based on the hypothesis of institutional thresholds for foreign aid effectiveness, the perilous character of development assistance to institutional quality has been broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. 
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